The Debtor as Victim by Buckley, F.H.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 87
Issue 4 May 2002 Article 5
The Debtor as Victim
F.H. Buckley
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
F.H. Buckley, The Debtor as Victim, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1078 (2002)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol87/iss4/5
BOOK REVIEW
THE DEBTOR AS VICTIM
F.H. Buckleyt
THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLAss: AMERicANs IN DEBT. By Teresa A. Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2000. Pp. xvii, 380. $35.00.
From the earliest days of the Republic, and even before, con-
sumer bankruptcy policy has been a contentious political issue. It has
spawned protest movements and populist ferment, and was an impor-
tant factor in the American Revolution.1 In recent years, consumer
bankruptcy filings have substantially increased and bankruptcy reform
proposals have occupied an important place on the legislative agenda.
More than a million American households now file for bankruptcy
each year, a four-fold increase since 1979.2 Not surprisingly, the rise
in consumer filings during a period of strong economic growth has
prompted calls to restrict access to consumer bankruptcy. Over the
last decade, lawmakers mounted two major efforts at bankruptcy re-
form. The first of these failed, and the second remains deadlocked in
conference committee.3
Consumer bankruptcy policy is thus an important legal issue.
Even so, The Fragile Middle Class4 is a remarkably overheated docu-
ment. With her co-authors, Teresa Sullivan reports that the American
middle class is in "crisis."5 We might think we are well off, but
"[l]urking behind the suburban house" is the frightening specter of
"burgeoning consumer debt."6 "Many in the middle class are eco-
t Professor, George Mason University School of Law; Director, George Mason Law
and Economics Center.
1 See T.H. BREEN, TOBACCO CULTURE: THE MENTALITY OF THE GREAT TIDEWATER
PLANTERS ON THE EVE OF REVOLUTION 31-32 (1985); WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDER.S:
INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA
61-62 (1999); Emory G. Evans, Planter Indebtedness and the Coming of the Revolution in Vir-
ginia, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 511 (1962).
2 TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 4 fig.1.1
(2000).
3 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. (2001); Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001).
4 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2.
5 Id. at 1.
6 Id. at2.
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nomically fragile, barely able to maintain their lifestyle."7 In the face
of this, Americans desperately seek to cling to the symbols of middle-
class prosperity through bankruptcy. "What declaring bankruptcy
[does] for them [is] provide a chance-often a last chance-to retain
their middle-class status."8 Take this away and we might see "revolt in
the streets."9
The book is weakened by its single-minded focus on debtors at
the moment they file for bankruptcy. In most cases, the findings are
trivial. For example, through a wealth of data we learn that bank-
ruptcy petitioners earn less and owe more than the average Ameri-
can. 10 As an aperfu, that ranks with a finding that more people drive
through green lights than red lights. What is troubling, however, is
the implicit assumption that an ex post perspective suffices, and that
debtors do not react to the incentive structure of the bankruptcy re-
gime ex ante when they borrow. "The problem is not bankruptcy it-
self," the authors claim, "bankruptcy is merely the treatment. The
core problem is that people are falling out of the middle class because
of overwhelming debts."' "1 Whatever the bankruptcy regime, they sug-
gest, the same number of people will tumble into default. 12
As such, the authors criticize recent efforts at bankruptcy reform
that would deny an absolute discharge to debtors who can afford to
pay their creditors over time. They report that the great majority of
bankruptcy petitioners "are overwhelmed by debt they could not pos-
sibly pay."'13 But while this is so, it ignores the possibility that debtors
would react to a more restrictive bankruptcy regime by scaling back
their indebtedness and taking greater precautions against risk. In any
event, a measure targeted at debtors who are able to pay their way out
of default should not be feared if, as the authors claim, nearly all debt-
ors are unable to do so.
Presumably, the authors reject rational choice models of behav-
ior, though their findings are consistent with economic rationality.
The fact that bankruptcy filings are higher in this country than in
7 Id. at xiv.
8 Id. at5.
9 Id. at 258.
10 See id. at 60 tbl.2.1, 61-62, 73.
11 Id. at 253.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 239. This leaves open the question whether anything would change were
consumer debtors more likely to be shunted into a Chapter 13 repayment plan, as is pro-
posed under draft bankruptcy reform legislation. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001,
S. 420, 107th Cong. (2001). Such a reform would make some debtors less willing to bor-
row. But others would have an added incentive to increase their leverage, if by increasing
the debt burden on default they reduce the likelihood that a Chapter 13 plan would be
forced on them. As such, the effect of bankruptcy reform measures is ambiguous. At a
minimum, such measures would place a greater burden on courts to police end-period
misbehavior.
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other common-law countries is consistent with the stronger safety net
and tougher bankruptcy laws of those countries. Nor are we surprised
to learn that about one-half of the petitioners are homeowners, 14
given the incentives to home ownership in American tax law. We
would also expect credit card abusers to be in the minority, since bar-
riers to debtor opportunism in the Bankruptcy Code penalize the end-
period behavior of borrowers who spend freely just before filing.' 5 As
such, the authors' hostility to economic models looks rather like a
profession of faith.
No doubt it is far easier to gather survey data at the moment of
bankruptcy than at other times. Nevertheless, it would also have been
useful to find out how the petitioners fared after they emerged from
bankruptcy, in order to see whether they might have repaid their
debts. The authors cite studies from the 1980s and early 1990s sug-
gesting that many employees struggle to find new jobs after job
losses. 16 Our economy has become far more dynamic in recent years,
however, and unemployment rates have declined sharply. The most
recent survey indicates that only twenty-five percent of those who lost
theirjobs between 1995 and 1997 remained unemployed by February
1998.17 One-half had jobs at their old salaries or better.'8 It is no
longer the case that Americans expect to end their careers with the
employer they began with, and most of us bounce happily from one
job to another. The pink slip is no longer the catastrophe it once was.
The hostility to economic explanations of behavior was also evi-
dent in an earlier book by the three authors, which purported to find
that economic explanations of bankruptcy were untenable. 19 In fact,
their findings were consistent with economic models of the bank-
ruptcy decision, and a review of the book by a prominent bankruptcy
theorist concluded that the authors simply failed to understand the
economic analysis of bankruptcy.20 Since the new book also lacks a
theoretical account of debt and the bankruptcy decision, I shall sketch
one out. I shall then evaluate the argument for the bankruptcy dis-
charge, with particular attention to arguments that The Fragile Middle
Class seems to favor.
14 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 202.
15 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. V 1999).
16 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 88-90.
17 Id. at 17 & n.17 (citing Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Worker Displacement, 1995-97 (Aug. 19, 1998), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/
news.release/History/disp.081998.news (last visited Feb. 7, 2002)).
18 Id.
19 See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CON-
SUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989).
20 See Michelle J. White, Economic Versus Sociological Approaches to Legal Research: The
Case of Bankruptcy, 25 LAw & Soc'y REv. 685 (1991) (book review). The review is not cited
in the new book.
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I
THE BENEFITS OF PERSONAL LEVERAGE
A simple way to reduce consumer bankruptcy levels would be to
ban consumer debt. However, that would sacrifice the gains that lev-
erage offers consumers. In a world without taxes, personal debt offers
benefits to consumers in four ways: (1) as a consumption smoothing
device; (2) as a bonding device; (3) as an incentivizing device; and (4)
as a means of reducing information costs. In addition, American tax
subsidies to personal debt financing provide a fifth explanation for
how consumers benefit from personal leverage. 2'
Borrowing is a form of dissaving, in which debtors draw down on
future earnings to fund present consumption. For most of us, saving
connotes frugal virtue; and, as the reverse of the medal, dissaving sug-
gests prodigality and imprudence. But these are often crude carica-
tures. Leverage permits the debtor to smooth out consumption so as
to avoid feasts and famines, through saving and dissaving at different
times in his life cycle. The prudent consumer will save in the fat years
and dissave in the lean ones. For example, he will save while he is
earning and spend his nest egg during retirement. Saving may thus
be excessive when the miser hoards present wealth beyond the reason-
able prospect of future consumption (either for him or for his cher-
ished descendants).22 And dissaving is prudent when the gains from
present consumption exceed the costs associated with deferred future
consumption. The miser might be a withered, cold-hearted wretch,
like Moliere's Harpagon; but he might also be an eighteen-year-old
with the soul of an accountant who passes up an affordable trip to
Europe in order to save for law school. Sometimes it is more prudent
to burn one's candle at both ends, and save in the middle years.
The borrowing decision might also be a rational self-binding
strategy. Suppose that a person lacks assets to take up a valuable in-
vestment opportunity, and to finance it must choose between issuing
an equity claim (in the form of a partnership interest) or a debt claim
(by borrowing). He might then prefer to issue debt because the possi-
bility of default (which does not exist in pure equity financing) binds
him to pursue and exploit the opportunity. When the parties are re-
lated, for example, the debtor might insist on debt financing to in-
crease the probability of repayment. The obligation to repay moneys
21 See F.H. Buckley, The American Fresh Start, 4 S. CAL. INTERDisc. L.J. 67 (1994).
22 While Franco Modigliani's life-cycle theory assumed that people seek to consume
all their wealth in their own lifetimes, other models assume a bequest motive in which
people seek to pass on wealth to their survivors after death. See RobertJ. Barro, Are Govern-
ment Bonds Net Wealth, 82J. PoL ECON. 1095 (1974). But see LAURENCEJ. KOTLIKOFF, Es-
SAYS ON SAVING, BEQUESTS, ALTRUISM, AND LiFE-vc'LE PLANNING 175-302 (2001) (finding
no evidence of intergenerational altruism).
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in the future also disciplines the borrower against future profligacy,
just as high leverage binds a firm against the accumulation of "free
cash flow" in Michael Jensen's model of corporate borrowing. 23 Jen-
sen argues that the requirement that corporate debt be repaid use-
fully prevents a firm from hoarding revenues from investors and
investing profits in wasteful opportunities.24 In the same way, the obli-
gation to repay personal debt prevents the accumulation of personal
free cash flow that would otherwise bum a hole in the debtor's
pocket.
Home purchases are one example of this strategy. While borrow-
ing is usually thought to transfer money from future to present peri-
ods, the direction of the wealth transfer is reversed in home
mortgages. While the debtor lives in the house he consumes a por-
tion of its value. But he is also saving for future consumption, since
houses are durable and appreciable goods and therefore represent an
investment. Indeed, houses are often an individual's largest asset and
his most important private source of retirement savings.25 On retire-
ment, the debtor will ordinarily cash in the house by trading down to
a smaller house, using the proceeds of the sale as a nest egg. While
The Fragile Middle Class criticizes the "house poor," whose monthly
housing expenses exceed twenty-eight percent of their gross monthly
income, 26 this group often includes the richest, savviest, and most pru-
dent consumers.
Debt financing might also be a useful incentivizing strategy for
debtors. Since the debtor keeps all of the project's upside above the
cost of the loan, he has greater reason to exploit successful projects.
This is the flip side of what finance economists call the "cost of
debt. '27 Leverage sometimes imposes a cost on the firm by increasing
its incentive to invest in suboptimal projects. This might happen
when there is a possibility that the firm will default on the loan. Since
the firm will not bear the full cost of default, it has an incentive to
invest in excessively risky projects. When the probability of default is
slight or nonexistent, however, leverage might give firm managers and
insiders a stronger incentive to pursue profitable opportunities.
When the opportunity is financed with equity, profits must always be
23 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986).
24 Id.
25 Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, Aging and the Income Value of Housing Wealth, 44J.
PUB. ECON. 371 (1991).
26 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 218 & n.65 (quoting BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL BRIEF No. SB91-19, HousE-PooR/HousE-RICH (1991)).
27 The misincentives of risky debt are discussed in Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 333-43 (1976). See Merton H. Miller, The Wealth Transfers of Bankruptcy:
Some Illustrative Examples, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 39.
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shared with outside shareholders or partners. But when the project is
financed with riskless debt, firm managers and insiders will not share
upside profits with outside investors, and the firm is better incen-
tivized to exploit the project. The benefits of debt might thus out-
weigh the costs of debt.
Personal debt also reduces the information production costs of
financing a project through screening and signaling gains. Screening
refers to the information that outside investors must produce in evalu-
ating the claim they receive. In equity financing, the investor must
assign a probability and value to the entire spread of outcomes. By
contrast, in debt financing the creditor can ignore outcomes above
the amount of principal plus accrued interest. When lenders are bet-
ter informed about low-range outcomes, screening costs may then be
reduced through debt financing. For example, a banker might feel
reasonably confident about a fledgling lawyer's ability to earn $50,000
a year, but only the borrower will know whether he possesses the drive
and talent to earn $100,000.28
Personal debt financing might also reduce information costs
through signaling gains. The debtor's promise of repayment becomes
more credible when default imposes a cost upon the debtor, as it
would in a world without bankruptcy discharges. The willingness to
run the risk of default might then reveal the debtor's private beliefs
about project values. High-quality debtors, who run a small risk of
default, would be more willing to assume the risk of default than less
creditworthy low-quality debtors. 29
American tax policies provide a fifth benefit of personal leverage.
American tax law subsidizes personal debt by treating home residence
as a nontaxable benefit and by permitting individual taxpayers to de-
duct interest payments on home mortgages of under $1 million.30
Other countries deny home mortgage deductibility because the tax-
payer enjoys the tax-free benefit of the purchase by living in the
house: no deductibility, but no imputed taxable benefit either. Only
America offers the taxpayer relief at both ends, with mortgage interest
deductibility and no imputed taxable benefit, and this tax subsidy bi-
ases consumers towards home purchases. As the benefit of the subsidy
increases with the size of the mortgage, the richest Americans may
28 For an argument that secured lending serves screening efficiencies, see F.H. Buck-
ley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1424-26 (1986).
29 Signaling explanations of debt financing are speculative. They assume that low-
quality debtors have the most to fear from default. However, the lowest-quality debtor,
who has nothing left to lose, will not be worried by the threat of default, and the signal
might thus unwind. See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of
Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17-21 (1981). Signaling explanations might yet sur-
vive if the low-quality debtor could be identified through creditor screening.
30 See 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (1994).
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find very expensive houses surprisingly affordable when the tax sub-
sidy is taken into account.31
II
THE COSTS OF BANKRUPTCY
The benefits of personal leverage would be weakened in a state
that refused to enforce promissory obligations or that circumscribed
the terms of loan agreements. As such, the debtor's right to seek a
bankruptcy discharge is not an unalloyed blessing. Bankruptcy af-
fords relief at the moment of discharge, but makes it more difficult to
secure credit when a loan is sought, and the rule of illegality that pre-
vents a debtor from waiving bankruptcy relief might therefore seem a
curious piece of paternalism. An absolute promise of repayment is
treated like a promise to commit a crime, and made unenforceable as
an illegal contract.
Secured lending law affords some relief from paternalistic fetters
on free contracting. While the debt obligation is discharged, the se-
cured lender's property rights are afforded a strong measure of pro-
tection. So long as the value of the collateral secured by the loan
exceeds the value of the loan, the creditor can expect to be paid. This
protects the home mortgage financer, as well as the current-assets fi-
nancer when the debtor carries on a business. However, Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code prevents consumer debtors from
pledging future earnings or consumer goods as collateral, 32 and the
nonwaivable bankruptcy discharge will therefore limit the debtor's
ability to borrow.
The bankruptcy discharge introduces an additional cost for con-
sumers. As I noted above, personal leverage imposes incentive costs
the magnitude of which depends in part on the probability of default.
Riskless debt imposes no incentive costs, but as the probability of de-
fault increases so too does the incentive to invest in wasteful high-risk,
high-return opportunities. These costs are greatest just before de-
fault, when the creditors bear the entire loss and the upside accrues
primarily to the individual. We are always ready to gamble with other
people's money when it's "heads you lose, tails I win." Moreover, con-
sumer debtors who approach default have an incentive to overcon-
sume, since they can pass the cost on to the creditors. All parties are
31 In the Washington area, this phenomenon is called the "McClean McMansion": the
6000-square-foot Elizabethan-Georgian-Victorian pile with Palladian windows and a three-
car garage facing the street on a quarter-acre lot.
32 See U.C.C. § 9-204(2) (1972) ("No security interest attaches... to consumer goods
... unless the debter acquires rights in them within ten days after the secured party gives
value.").
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aware of the end-period problem, and this will increase the cost of
credit when the individual borrows, even if he is solvent at that time.
Finally, it has been suggested that high bankruptcy levels give rise
to distrust externalities. Interpersonal trust is a crucial element in the
social norms that Jon Elster calls the cement of society.3 3 Without
trust, joint plans for cooperation become impossible.
For example, Edward Banfield described a society so riddled with
envy-a precapitalist Italian town he called "Montegrano"-that any
form of economic progress was unthinkable.3 4 The Montegranese
thought that every politician was on the take, that every priest was
corrupt, that every employer cheated his employees. Only the most
basic forms of economic cooperation were possible.
[A] ll those who stand outside of the small circle of the family are at
least potential competitors and therefore also potential enemies.
Toward those who are not of the family the reasonable attitude is
suspicion. The parent knows that other families will envy and fear
the success of his family and that they are likely to seek to do it
injury. He must therefore fear them and be ready to do them injury
in order that they may have less power to injure him and his. 35
Trust is much more than a matter of economic calculation, for it
is basic to the fundamental human desire for solidarity. Without trust
our friendships would become affairs of momentary convenience, on
which no plans, no projects for future cooperation, could be formed.
We rely so often upon friends and associates that we often forget we
are doing so. We scatter our promises about, without paying much
attention to what we are doing. We make seemingly trivial promises,
to meet for lunch or to return a call, on whose performance deep
friendships depend. And we make unspoken promises that are the
foundation of trust: I will take your side; I will not betray you.
Trust is weakened by legal institutions that are too quick to for-
give the promise-breaker. The costs of breach are directly borne by
the promisee, such as the spouse who is cast aside under a no-fault
divorce law. In addition, promise-breaking may impose the third-
party costs that economists call externalities, when others realize they
live in a coarser society and future promisors find it harder to per-
suade promisees to rely on them. With the remarkable rise in con-
sumer bankruptcy filings during a period of prosperity, it is not
33 SeeJON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SoCIE= A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER (1989).
34 See EDwARD C. BANFIELD, THE MORAL BAsIs OF A BACKWARD SOCIETY (Free Press
1967) (1958).
35 Id. at 110-11.
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implausible to suggest that American fresh-start policies give rise to
similar distrust externalties.3 6
III
THE BENEFITS OF BANKRUPTCY
The costs of bankruptcy that I have outlined are theoretical ones,
and theory without facts is sometimes a menace, as Karl Llewellyn re-
minded us.3 7 But facts without theory is a mess. The Fragile Middle
Class is replete with factual tidbits, often anecdotal, but lacks a unify-
ing theory that explains the authors' support for the present bank-
ruptcy regime and their hostility to bankruptcy reform. Instead, the
authors raise a variety of arguments, often without supporting evi-
dence, that point in quite different directions.
Nowhere is the inconsistency more clear than in the two principal
claims made by the book: (1) consumer debt levels are too high;38 and
(2) legislative efforts to restrict consumer access to bankruptcy are
wrong-headed.3 9 Absent some way of determining optimal consumer
levels, it is difficult to speak of excessive consumer leverage. But if
one wishes to reduce consumer borrowing, the most obvious way to
do so is to increase the cost of default. After all, it cannot be an acci-
dent that consumer filing rates are lower in countries with tougher
bankruptcy regimes. Penalize something and you get less of it; subsi-
dize it and you get more of it. However, this simple lesson in econom-
ics seems to have been missed by the authors, who want
simultaneously to reduce consumer borrowing while subsidizing de-
fault through an easy bankruptcy discharge.
A. The Argument from Paternalism
The authors appear to deny any connection between the bank-
ruptcy regime and leverage levels, possibly because they believe that
consumers react to market choices as children do. Consider this
description of the infantile car purchaser: "Americans are buying
larger and more luxurious cars, complete with sound systems, com-
puter monitoring devices, and four-wheel drive.... [T]he breathtak-
ing prices of these gleaming machines require most middle-class
buyers to incur hefty debt, repayable over ever-longer periods at high
36 See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 393,
400-08 (2001).
37 See Louis J. Hector, Book Review, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1590, 1590 & n.2 (1968).
38 See SULLrVAN Er AL., supra note 2, at 239 ("[T] he great majority of debtors in bank-
ruptcy are overwhelmed by debt... ").
39 Id. at 253.
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interest rates."40 Describing consumer purchasers in Mexico or South
Korea in so patronizing a manner would rightly be thought insulting.
Nevertheless, some purchasers are weak-willed, and the authors
might seem on firmer ground when they attribute the run-up in con-
sumer filings to credit card debt.41 Credit cards are more available
than ever before, and it is easy to incur debts through impulse
purchases. On average, more than forty-one invitations went out in
1997 to each American household.42 From 1986 to 1997, credit card
debt doubled in the United States, Britain, and Canada.43 For Ameri-
can bankruptcy petitioners, listed credit card debt increased from a
mean of $3635 in 1981 to $11,529 in 1991 to $14,260 in 1997. 44
Credit card companies make a convenient target for those who
oppose bankruptcy reform, and the authors happily take up the cud-
gels. The interest rates charged by today's credit card lenders would
have been illegal in the past, when they were "associated with shadowy
alleyways and large men wearing brass knuckles."45 For consumer bor-
rowers, easy credit is likened to the company store in which workers
have no choice but to buy from a single source at inflated prices. 46
What the authors fail to note is that consumer debt levels have been as
high or higher in the past,47 and credit card debt simply takes up a
greater share of consumer borrowing today. They also fail to note
that the credit card industry is highly competitive, and that there just
might be a link between high interest charges and the increasing will-
ingness of consumer debtors to burn off credit card loans through a
bankruptcy discharge. 48
If consumers borrow excessively because they are weak-willed, or
because they underestimate the probability of default, the case for en-
forcing waivers of discharge rights would be much weakened. How-
ever, the authors fail to uncover evidence of substantial consumer
40 Id. at 3-4.
41 Id. at 245. The authors explain:
[T]here are a number of solidly middle-class people in our country-peo-
ple who get up every morning and go to work and get their kids to school-
who cannot handle credit. These people are the object of an endless seduc-
tion by an industry willing to play to their weakness and successful at doing
SO.
Id. at 250 (footnote omitted).
42 Id. at 135.
43 Id. at 258.
44 Id. at 122 tbl.4.1.
45 Id. at 248-49.
46 Id. at 248.
47 In 1890, each household had about $880 of debt, against an average annual salary
of $475 for nonfarmworkers. LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM: A CuL-
TURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 40 (1999). Consumer leverage ratios are lower today.
See Suu.wvAN ET Ai., supra note 2, at 220 fig.7.2.
48 SeeJudge Edith H. Jones & ToddJ. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L.
Rav. 177, 227-42.
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irrationality. While credit card debt has increased, the percentage of
defaults that might be attributed primarily to credit card misuse-per-
haps one in ten-remains small. 49 Credit cards take up a greater per-
centage of consumer indebtedness, but cannot account for the run-up
in consumer bankruptcy rates. Moreover, the "tipping point" that
drives consumers into bankruptcy has remained unchanged over the
last twenty years: the total debt burden in inflation-adjusted dollars
and the ratio of total debt to income is a constant.
The picture that emerges from the book is not one of irrational
borrowers, but rather of ordinary people who file when they lose their
jobs or incur a major medical liability. As such, the argument from
paternalism is weak, particularly when raised against bankruptcy re-
form measures that seek to harmonize America's bankruptcy laws with
those of other first-world countries by denying a discharge to those
who are able to pay off their debts.
B. Debt Slavery
The second argument for bankruptcy is that without a discharge,
the overcommitted debtor might lack any incentive to work. By per-
mitting him to retain future earnings, the fresh-start policies of bank-
ruptcy correct this misincentive. "As far back as Henry Clay," note the
authors, "Americans decided that collectively we would all be better
off to cut the losers loose from their old debts so they could try the
game again."'50
While this argument assumes that the alternative to consumer
bankruptcy is debt slavery, it ignores the possibility of an ex post pri-
vate workout. Debt slavery is highly inefficient, and one would expect
the parties to seek to bargain around it, as the Coase Theorem would
predict.51 Suppose that in every state of the world all of the debtor's
earnings would go to pay off his debt claims. Since the debtor would
have no incentive to work, these claims will be valueless. Creditors
might therefore increase the value of their claims by scaling them
back, even as a state might increase tax revenues under the Laffer
Curve by easing back from a 100% marginal rate. In this way, the
parties can always bargain around debt constraints to ensure that all
valuable opportunities are taken up.
Nevertheless, the parties might fail to agree on a private workout
because of informational asymmetries about future prospects or hid-
den assets. In addition, holdout problems might make it difficult for
the parties to effect a private workout when there are more than a few
creditors. While all creditors as a group might be made better off by
49 SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 22.
50 Id. at 258.
51 SeeR. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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scaling down debt claims, each creditor has the individual incentive to
hold out and let the other creditors take twenty cents on the dollar
while he is paid off in full. 52 This might explain why creditors relied
on debtors' prisons before the bankruptcy discharge became
available.
C. Debtor Risk Aversion
The argument from paternalism seeks to justify the bankruptcy
discharge on the basis that, left on their own, consumers would incur
excessive debt. Paradoxically, the third argument for the bankruptcy
discharge suggests that, left on their own, consumers would take on
too little debt because of their risk aversion. When the debtor is made
to bear the full costs of economic failure through a denial of a fresh
start in bankruptcy, he might turn down a profitable opportunity be-
cause he is not indifferent to risk. He might insulate himself from a
portion of the downside risk when it takes the form of a business op-
portunity by bargaining for a homemade discharge through a limited
liability company. For consumer borrowing, however, incorporation
is not an option.
Absent a bankruptcy discharge, the costs of consumer risk aver-
sion would plausibly be greater in America than in other countries.
As the authors note, the social safety net is less extensive here than in
Britain and Canada.53 In America, job loss often means the loss of
medical insurance unless the consumer is so poor that he can qualify
for Medicaid. In addition, American tax law gives consumers a
greater incentive to increase their leverage through home mortgage
deductibility. As such, Americans are more likely to fall into financial
distress than Britons and Canadians, as evidenced by the sharp differ-
ences in national filing rates.
Since job loss is the most frequent cause of default,54 bankruptcy
might be a particularly useful incentive device in attracting employees
to work in high-riskjobs, such as start-up ventures. The risk-averse will
ordinarily seek to purchase insurance against losses, but private insur-
ance will not be offered for job losses because of the moral hazard
problem-insured people will work less hard when they are cush-
ioned on the risk ofjob loss. The same problem arises when employ-
ees are offered a fresh start in bankruptcy, but to a lesser extent. In
addition, a general bankruptcy law does not give rise to the adverse
52 See Mark Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 238 (1987).
But since the cost of holdout strategies is born by the debtor, he has every incentive to
ensure that this does not happen by restricting his borrowing to a single major lender. See
F.H. Buckley, The American Stay, 3 S. CAL. INTaRDisc. LJ. 733, 756 (1994).
53 SuuruvAN ET Ai.., supra note 2, at 257.
54 Id. at 75.
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selection problems of private insurance markets, in which those most
at risk are most likely to seek coverage.
The authors see bankruptcy as a safety net, but implausibly regard
the discharge as a disguised welfare policy and resist bankruptcy re-
form in the name of distributional justice.55 This is problematic for
two reasons. First, welfare policies should pass the burden of caring
for the less advantaged to the wealthiest Americans. However, the
burden of easy discharges is placed upon the poorest consumers, in
the form of high interest rates on credit cards. The wealthiest borrow-
ers, who pay off their monthly balances on time, never encounter
these charges. Instead, credit card debt has become a form of sub-
prime lending for those who cannot obtain a personal line of credit
from a bank. Second, the beneficiaries of the bankruptcy discharge
sometimes include wealthy professionals who shelter large homes
from creditors in states that permit them to do so through homestead
exemptions. In welfare schemes, the wealth transfer is not supposed
to run from the poor to the rich, and bankruptcy reform that would
introduce something like means-testing to prevent this would seem
eminently just from a distributional perspective. The safety net argu-
ment for bankruptcy is eminently plausible, but only as a device to
correct an incentive problem and not as a disguised welfare measure.
In sum, economic theory plausibly supports a broad discharge for
consumer debtors. However, some form of means-testing would ap-
pear sensible, on both efficiency and equity grounds.
IV
BANKRUPTCY RELIEF AS CONSUMERISM
The Fragile Middle Class is a curious relic from an earlier age of
legal scholarship, when a lack of economic sophistication did not dis-
qualify academics from making policy pronouncements. To be sure,
rational choice models in economics are sometimes criticized for their
robust assumptions about consumer choice. However, the debate
about "bounded rationality" and information costs takes place within
the framework of economics, and no serious modern scholar would
suggest that consumers are unable to react in any way to the incentive
structure of a legal regime.
However, this is just what the authors assert in their study of con-
sumer bankruptcy petitions. For them, economic failure is always a
matter of exogenous shocks where the risk of loss cannot be reduced
by anything the debtor might do ex ante to lower the probability of
default. They assume, in short, that the debtor is quite incapable of
taking fewer financial risks or borrowing less money. Having made
55 See id. at 169, 257-58.
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this assumption, they then assign the entire blame for the run-up in
consumer bankruptcies to credit card companies, even though they
report that credit card debt is a minor cause of bankruptcy. Since
credit card companies are taking their licks in a highly political debate
over bankruptcy reform in Congress, the book reads more like a parti-
san brief than a work of scholarship.
The book's emphasis on consumer protection also seems frozen
in the thirty-year-old amber of 1970s legal scholarship. "If the world
were a more comfortable place for middle-class Americans," they say,
"we would not be writing this book. '56 However, a more recent vein of
scholarship, which cuts across standard political labels, is explicitly
anti-consumerist. It prizes private virtue more than consumer spend-
ing, being more than having, and St. Francis more than the yuppie
debtor. Its members take their inspiration from economists like Rob-
ert Frank,57 historians like Christopher Lasch,58 and political scientists
like Daniel Bell.59 Not to mention Pope John Paul 11.60 Anti-con-
sumerism sees the overcommitted debtor not as a passive victim who is
preyed upon by credit card companies but as an active decisionmaker
who is deluded about life's basic goods. He is not a pawn of forces
over which he is powerless, but instead is responsible for his actions.
Like Imelda Marcos and Madame Bovary, he might even be faintly
ridiculous.
Anti-consumerism is not a recent phenomenon, and some of its
earliest advocates espoused highly illiberal political beliefs. (Marx
and Heidegger come to mind.) After rejecting consumer sovereignty,
it might be a short step to impugning the individual's political prefer-
ences, which is why consumerism is often a good deal more egalita-
rian and democratic than its alternatives. Tom Wolfe has noted that
passengers on Mediterranean cruises now jostle elbows with working-
56 Id. at 6.
57 See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF
ExcEss (1999). Frank sees the competition for status as wasteful, since it generates con-
sumption externalities: consumption of a status good by one person imposes a status cost
on another. To address this, he proposes consumption taxes.
58 Lasch's attack on the hedonism implicit in consumerism may be found in CHRISTO-
PHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF DIMINISHING EXPEC-
TATIONS (1978). For his praise of the anti-consumerist ideals of craftsmanship, see
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS (1991), and
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE MINIMAL SELF- PSYCHIC SURVIVAL IN TROUBLED TIMES 193-95
(1984).
59 See DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITAusM (1976). The con-
tradiction Bell had in mind was that free markets depend on a stock of private virtues that
in his view they tend to subvert. History has not been kind to this thesis, first advanced by
Bell in 1976.
60 See POPE JOHN PAUL II, ON THE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF RERUM NOVARUM
(CENTEsIMUS ANNUs): ENCYCLICAL LETTER MAY 1, 1991 paras. 19, 39, available at http://
wvv.vatican.va/holy-father/j ohn~paulii/encyclicals/documents/hf jp-
ii enc_01051991_centesimus-annusen.html.
2002] 1091
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
class Americans, 61 and there is something a little churlish about ob-
jecting to this. There is also a heavy seriousness to anti-consumerism
that makes one want to reach for the droll celebrations of conspicu-
ous consumption found in P.J. O'Rourke andJames Twitchell. 62 Like
Moliere, we often prefer a comfortable vice to a fatiguing virtue. Fi-
nally, there is little evidence that consumerism has done much to
weaken the ability of Americans to react to a true crisis, such as the
terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In-
deed, consumerism is now regarded, not implausibly, as a patriotic
affirmation of American values.
We need not seek to resolve this debate. Economics is a positive
science, and the economist is not called on to take sides. If asked,
however, he might offer advice on what would increase or reduce con-
sumer spending. To the anti-consumerist, then, he might propose a
reform of bankruptcy law that makes petitioners repay more of their
debts. If we are too materialistic or status-driven, the last thing we
need is incentive to incur consumer debt through a lax bankruptcy
regime.
61 See TOM WOLFE, HOOKING UP (2000).
62 See P.J. O'RouRE, EAT THE RICH (1998);JAMEs B. TWITCHELL, LEAD Us Irro TEMP-
TATION: THE TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN MATERIALISM (1999). For a reminder that consumer-
ism may take a variety of forms, left and right, see DAVID BRooKs, BOBOS IN PARADISE: THE
NEW UPPER CLASS AND How THEY GOT THERE (2000).
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